

are harmless, they remain as witnesses to the exuberance of Life's eccentricities. Amongst these unpractical impulses the aesthetic are conspicuous. We are accustomed to regard them as man's peculiar endowment. Not so. Can we deny an appreciation of the aesthetic to a bird, or to a robin, singing, when love instincts are dormant, on a chilly November afternoon?

§

Let us now attempt to formulate the heads under which instincts may be classified.

We may, in the first place, form four groups of impulses that are of essential practical value to organisms in their *individual* and *social* lives, in their function of *reproducing* their species and in their *provisions* for the future. Next come in four more groups, impulses that from the utilitarian point of view are superfluous, and are, indeed, if classed in two pairs, antagonistic to one another—kindness (or an impulse to fondle), *cruelty* (or an impulse to hurt), *aesthetic* impulses which induce self-abandonment, and *ethical* impulses which induce self-control. There remain two compelling guides to behaviour, *directive instinct*, and the processes which constitute *reason*.

INDIVIDUALISTIC.—In this group fall the impulses that stimulate and direct the development and growth of the body and the functioning of its organs. These arouse no emotions, and are

therefore not apprehended. Self-preservation—
the primary and most imperious object
of ^{external} behaviour—is, on the other hand,
actuated by
impulses that are generally emotional—
—hunger
and *thirst*, *chilliness* (the impulse to
maintain the
temperature of the body), the *hunting*
passion,